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Humans (Homo sapiens) are known to cooperate with non-kin and even strangers, yet there 
is no absolute explanation to human cooperation nor to non-kin altruism. Specific human traits such
as memory and reputation fuels systems of reciprocity, policing, reward and punishment which all 
contribute to cooperation in social interactions. How do people adopt their moral heuristics to 
knowledge of the most common beneficial way to act in confrontations with others? In this 
experiment I test this by anchoring teenagers to different strategies, either pure altruistic or altruistic
punishing, before playing iterate prisoner's dilemma. In contrast to findings in similar experiments, 
no differences in player's total cooperative plays, score nor mutual cooperative plays was found in 
this study. Yet, when anchored with pure altruistic strategies participants adopted nastier strategies 
than participants anchored with strategies for altruistic punishment. That is, I found no difference in 
their forgiveness, but free riding tendencies were more common in the groups anchored for pure 
altruism. In sum, human teenagers do not seem to get nicer by being told that it's in their best 
interest to be nice - rather the opposite. 
1.Introduction
Altruistic behaviour can be defined as beneficial behavior towards another not closely 
related individual, while simultaneously being detrimental to the individual performing the 
behavior. Benefit and detriment is here defined in terms of contribution to inclusive fitness (Trivers,
1971). Costly and fitness reducing acts which benefits other individuals are to a great extent 
restricted to kin groups, but in several species individuals show altruistic tendencies towards 
unrelated individuals (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005). Yet, there is no absolute explanation for this 
behavior and some solutions have been proposed; reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981), policing (Ratnieks, 1988; Frank, 1995) and systems of reward or punishment (Rapoport and 
Guyer, 1966; Oliver, 1980; Fehr, 2002).  
When repeated interactions are possible, the rewards for cooperation can be larger than the 
short-term pay off of a single defection. A classic example of this is found in vampire bat 
(Desmodus rotundus) colonies, where individuals are observed to share blood-meals with unrelated 
neighbours (Wilkinson, 1984). For the recipient, the meal could potentially save its life, while the 
donor, after a successful hunt for a large and resource rich blood meal, has little cost of giving away
a small quantity of its catch. Given a stable neighbourhood and repeated interactions, reciprocal 
altruistic interactions like these may be stable in long term interactions (Trivers, 1971). Yet, the 
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disadvantage for reciprocal altruists is their vulnerability towards individuals who are happy to 
accept help, but also eager to “forget” the payback. These non-reciprocal individuals (or free riders) 
reduce the fitness of altruists and they may therefore make reciprocity less likely to evolve (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981; Alcock, 2009).
In humans, genetically unrelated individuals cooperate within large groups and even with 
total strangers from other cultures, with everything from warfare to food-sharing (Nowak and 
Sigmund, 2005; Boyd and Richerson, 2005). Building a reputation, which is easily shared through 
language, is one of the key aspects that separate humans from other animals, and the ability to 
recognize and remember cheaters is a trait inherent to humans (Dunbar, 1993; Milinski et al., 2002).
It has been suggested that humans are very attentive to possibilities of individual reputation 
building, and when given the opportunity to gain a reputation for generosity, helping rates increase 
strongly (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005). Additionally, in decisions of whether to engage in 
reciprocity towards other individuals or not, positive or negative reputation has a strong influence. 
On the proximate level, certain brain signals are shown to promote cooperation towards partners 
with positive reputation, and these signals are absent towards partners with negative reputation, 
leading to more defection towards the latter (Phan et al., 2010). Therefore, the probability of 
repeated interactions are important, as anticipation of re encountering a present partner increases the
chance of present cooperation (Gachter and Falk, 2002; Van Lange et al., 2011). 
Punishment, on the other hand, provides a secondary tool to deprive free riders, if those who
exploit others cooperative actions are punished frequently enough (Heinrich and Boyd, 2001). Yet, 
there is often no direct fitness gain for the punisher. Thus, from the view of the entire group, 
punishing (i.e., altruistic punishment) of free riders is beneficial, but the incentive to punish from 
the individuals point of view is not (Fehr and Gachter, 2002). Punishment as a costly signal of 
trustworthiness could however benefit individuals in reciprocal groups, as humans are shown to 
rather reciprocate with individuals that have a reputation of altruistic punishment, than with 
individuals who don't punish (Kiyonari and Barclay, 2008; Jordan et al., 2016). Humans are also 
able to use logic thinking to foresee outcomes of future interactions, so that choices made today can 
determine later choices of the players (Axelrod, 1984). That is, subjects often cooperate because 
they foresee the rewards for cooperation and the punishments for non-cooperation, and therefore 
adopt a longer-term perspective for the present situation (Axelrod, 1984; Van Lange et al., 2011).
Models of game theory has been popular tools for modelling individual interactions in 
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species from bacteria to humans. In order to understand reciprocal altruism in humans, a range of 
games have widely been used, including both two-player and multi player games with iterate and 
finite durations using different treatments (one-shot and repeated), and the published papers are in 
the thousands (Maynard Smith, 1982; Dugatkin and Reeve, 1998). Although papers dealing with 
two-player interactions have been criticized for being unrealistic, as interactions in real life always 
consist of multiple interaction, they can still be considered a special case; a small part of a larger 
multiverse of interactions (Gokhale and Troulsen, 2010).    
Prisoner's dilemma is a two player binary choice matrix, non-zero sum game that has been 
widely used as a model in biological- and social-sciences (Rapoport and Cammah, 1965; Maynard 
Smith, 1982; Axelrod, 1984). The game gives two choices of action; cooperate or defect. For any 
round of the game, defection yields a higher pay off than cooperation independent of the choice of 
opponent. The dilemma is that since defection has the highest potential benefit and cooperation the 
highest potential risk, the equilibrium of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is mutual defection. This 
equilibrium is deficient because the best outcome for both players is mutual cooperation (Rapoport 
and Cammah, 1965; Maynard Smith, 1982; Axelrod, 1984). Studies of iterate games of prisoner's 
dilemma often emphasize participant’s strategies (or decision rules), where strategies are 
specifications of what to do in any situation that may arise. How subjects design their strategies 
depend on several factors, from probabilities, past plays and previous patterns (Axelrod, 1984). 
Through extensive computer simulations, cooperative and forgiving strategies have been shown to 
outperform strategies relaying on defections (Axelrod, 1984; Nowak and Sigmund, 1992).  
How human behaviour in iterated rounds of prisoner’s dilemma is influenced by individual 
players immediate prior stimulus (ie., anchoring) was first studied in the late 1950's. Deutch (1958) 
induced players to feel cooperative or individualistic prior to playing one-shot and iterate games of 
prisoner’s dilemma, in both treatments players induced to feel cooperative, indeed cooperated with 
their partner to a greater extent than those who received the individualistic treatment. It is also 
documented that subtler contextual manipulations than those of Deutch (1958) can promote 
strategic changes in players, promoting either enhanced cooperative or defective plays both in one-
shot and iterate games (Ellingsen et al., 2012). Anchoring (i.e., priming or framing) effects in 
general has been studied mostly through numerical stimulus before solving informative or 
uninformative tasks (Tverksy and Kahneman, 1974). The term is described in various ways, but it is
mainly known as the effect of a specific stimulus on the psychophysical judgment of another 
stimulus. A known metaphor for anchoring is a boat using its anchor to keep it stable at rough sea, 
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in the same way we can use mental anchors as a holding point in the sea of thought. An 
implemented idea or thought can help judgment in new tasks, for example, anchoring of a stimulus 
like a value, will affect the judgment of deciding the numerical value of a task (Chapman and 
Johnson, 1994). All anchoring procedures involves presentation of an anchor and it is shown that 
anchors do have an effect on judgment and reasoning, either they are informative or uninformative 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Green et al., 1996).
In this study informative and instructive anchors are presented, and it is expected that 
participants would incorporate these anchors in their strategies when playing prisoner’s dilemma 
(Chapman and Johnson, 1994). Therefore, I examined whether instructing individuals to either be 
altruistic punisher's or pure altruists had effects on individual behaviour playing prisoner’s 
dilemma. That is, how do individuals incorporate the external stimulus in their strategic choices 
playing the game? Given anchoring effects, it is expected that subjects would use anchors and 
incorporate them into their strategy. 
2.Materials and methods
2.1 Ethics statement
All participants in the experiments reported, signed an informed consent to participate. 
Additionally, their anonymity was always preserved (in agreement with the Norwegian Law for 
Personal Data Protection) by assigning them as player 1, player 2 and judge within random groups. 
No association was ever made between their real names and their results.
2.2 Methods
The experiment was conducted in 6 high school classes of 24 - 28 students each (N = 94). 
Subjects where either freshmen or second-year’s at high school with a mean age of 16.5 ± 0.5 years 
and with a slight female biased sex ratio (56 %). For all groups, practical implementation of plays 
where held in their classroom with both their science teacher and the researcher present. Every 
subject where given a formal introduction to the rules of iterated prisoner’s dilemma and introduced
to the pay out matrix (appendix 1). The subjects where then divided into groups of three, with one 
judge and two players according to the seating diagram (appendix 2). Within each class, subjects 
could choose their own groups to their liking, resulting in groups consisting almost entirely of well 
4
known acquaintances (pers. obs.). Each player where given two play cards designated “cooperate” 
and “defect” to keep stored on their thighs. Implementation of every round started with judges 
giving a signal to their players, which in turn picked the card corresponding to their play of choice. 
Judges where given the score sheet (appendix 3) to record individual players move and score from 
either of the two players in each round. There where no physical boundaries between the players 
and they could easily communicate with each other and the judge.
   
In three sessions, where each session consisted of one class of students, the anchor of 
altruism where presented, and for the other three sessions, an anchor for altruistic punishment. 
These anchors were designed to represent different strategies with differing incentives for reciprocal
altruism. Anchors where presented alternated by me as a short lecture after game rules and 
procedures of the game where explained, but before the game actually where played. The anchor of 
altruism were a short lecture of the importance of niceness for cooperation (appendix 4), while the 
altruistic punishment anchor put more focus on punishment of defection and its importance for 
successful cooperation (appendix 5).
The number of rounds to be played where not known to any of the subjects, and there where 
no time limit. That is, subjects were not able to guess the endpoint of the game, yet 21 rounds were 
played in all games. In all groups each round where played simultaneously and subjects where 
given a pay out in cash related to their performance in the game. This is an unusual setup for 
prisoner’s dilemma games, as players normally either are not able to see or speak to each other (or 
both), and as judges received a pay out, which was equal to the average of the two players they 
judged. Using this pay out structure, workload and resources in the form of objective judges were 
massively reduced. It can also promote better understanding of game rules and its incentives for the 
participants, but on the other hand, communication within pairs could also trigger a higher than 
normal rate of cooperation (Sally, 1995; Baillet, 2010). As judges also where given pay outs, mutual
cooperation in their pair, would maximize the judges payout (see pay out matrix). Most laboratory 
experiments in game theory are designed to remove social effects such as kindness, but in open 
experiments like the present, social effects could influence participants behaviour (Andreoni, 1995).
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3.Results
There was no difference in number of cooperative rounds, total score (pay out), number of 
mutually cooperative rounds or number of mutually defective rounds between treatments (see Table 
1).
Table.1: Test statistics
Test Treatment Mean Value SE N t value p value 
Cooperative
Plays 
Altruistic 14.92 0.67 94 0.33 0.74Reciprocal 15.24 0.71 94
Total 
Score
Altruistic 47.88 1.91 94 0.38 0.71Reciprocal 48.89 1.89 94
Mutual
Cooperation
Altruistic 7.79 1.46 74 0.51 0.62Reciprocal 8.91 1.68 74
Mutual 
Defection 
Altruistic 1.42 0.32 74 1.18 0.25  Reciprocal 0.96 0.22 74
Table 1: Results from 21 rounds of prisoner’s dilemma calculated by unpaired t-test between 
players anchored with either reciprocal or altruistic anchors. Cooperative plays shows individual 
player’s average cooperative moves. Total score is individual player’s average total score in points 
(see pay out matrix). Mutual cooperation describes number of consecutive rounds were both 
players cooperated simultaneously. Mutual defection is the number of consecutive rounds were both
players defected simultaneously
Additionally, the first defection in each pair and the following moves were analysed 
specifically with regard to an a priori assumption about differences between the two groups in 
temptation to defect repeatedly. That is, I assumed that temptation of repeated defection would be 
higher in the group anchored to altruism than to reciprocity (see Tullberg and Tullberg, 1994). In the
opening move 16.67 % of the players from the altruistic anchor and 13.04 % from the altruistic 
punishment anchor defected in their opening move (Yates Chi-squared N = 74, X2  = 0.23, p = 0.63).
On average, the first defection within pairs of both anchors came on average after 1.3 rounds (N = 
47, SE = 0.85). This result is calculated discarding pairs that cooperated through all rounds of the 
game. I observed a slight tendency of more cooperation in the group anchored with reciprocal 
altruism, that is, the frequency of pairs that only cooperated throughout the session in the two 
groups was 16.7 % for altruism and 26.09 % for altruistic punishment (Yates chi-square N=47, X2 = 
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1.66, p = 0.19). 
I also tested whether players
forgave defections differently in the
two groups, that is, whether they
cooperated after first being defected by
their opponent. I found a non-
significant difference using unpaired t-
test (N = 74, t = 1.1 , p = 0.27, SE =
0.35) as players anchored with altruism
played 1.15 (SE = 0.3) cooperative
moves after being defected, and players
with the altruistic punishment anchor
played 0.76 (SE = 0.14) moves. The
frequency of defections following players first defection was tested specifically to reveal if free 
riding strategies differed between groups. I found a significant difference using an unpaired t-test (N
= 74, t = 2.57, p = 0.012, SE = 0.25) in the frequency of defections following the first defection by 
the defecting player. That is, players with an altruistic anchor defected on average 1.05 times (SE = 
0.21) in row, while players anchored with altruistic punishment defected on average 0.41 times (SE 
= 0.1) in a row (see illustration 1). 
4. Discussion
This study which anchored players of prisoner's dilemma with different cooperative 
strategies suggest that players do not adopt these strategies to the same extent as in previous 
research done in this field. I observed no significant difference between the groups in total numbers 
of cooperative acts, or in the numbers of rounds of mutual cooperation. Although players of both 
anchors started their games with approximately the same defect-cooperate ratio, the first defection 
in each game triggered different reactions. My analysis of forgiveness, that is, cooperative plays 
following the opponents defection were not significant. Yet, my findings revealed that players in 
groups anchored with altruism defect more frequent succeeding their first defection than players in 













Illustration 1: Mean number of defections following the 
first defection between the two groups. Error bars 
indicate standard errors of the mean. 
more vulnerable for free-riding (Heinrich and Boyd, 2001), and reciprocal morality are more than 
capable to motivate humans to behave nice to each other (Tullberg and Tullberg, 1994).
The minority of players in iterate prisoner's dilemma choose to defect in their opening move 
(Grujic et al., 2012), and this can also be said for players in this study. The average first defection  
came early (1.3 rounds), and could be contributed by the players learning the incentives of the game
(Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010). Also, when comparing simple parameters, such as player's total 
cooperative or defective rates, I expected to find differences between treatments. My results show, 
on the other hand, that player’s from both groups defect and cooperate in approximately the same 
fashion. This is also reflected in player’s average total scores, which do not differ between groups. 
These results are in contrast to previous research where participants are more willing to cooperate 
even in one-shot games when cooperative choices are expected from their partners (Liberman, 
2004; Sally, 1995). Even after small manipulations like renaming prisoner’s dilemma to “stock 
market game” or “community game”, effects in the predicted directions (i.e., less and more 
cooperation, respectively) were observed between players in the two treatments (Liberman, 2004; 
Ellingsen et al., 2012). Although the anchoring process in the present study included specific 
instructions about how to act, effects are not seen throughout the 21 rounds of the game. 
Mutual cooperation in iterated, two players games is a stable strategy (Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981) and could be descriptive of an adopted reciprocal behavior by the players (Stevens 
et al., 2002). As a stable reciprocal environment were more likely to appear in the group anchored 
with altruistic punishment, I expected longer cooperative streaks in this group compared to that 
anchored with altruism. Yet, I found no significant difference in mutual cooperation, nor in 100% 
cooperating pairs between groups. The altruistic punishing groups had, however, slightly longer 
cooperative streaks than the pure altruists and more pairs cooperated through the entire length of the
game. Social effects, such as kindness (Andreoni, 1995), “the shadow of the future” (Axelrod, 
1984) and being observed by their acquaintances in the open structure of the study, might in this 
case have had a greater effect than the anchors presented. These factors were similar for both groups
and would therefore impact players in the same way, even though anchors instructed them 
otherwise (Sally, 1995; Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010). It is also shown that communication and being 
watched enhances chances of cooperation (Sally, 1995; Hilbe and Sigmund, 2010). Additionally, 
being acquaintances might also have had a positive affect on cooperation in this study, as 
participants performance here may have affected their reputation in their real world daily life more 
than what would be the case with interactions towards strangers. That is, participants could see, 
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interact and remember their opponent’s choices, choices that would play a part in further 
interactions after the game itself was finished. Interactions with others that the individual want to 
keep a good reputation towards, could make the decision not to defect easier than if the game where
played anonymously.  
Cooperation following an opponent's defection is not a rational choice for any player of 
prisoner's dilemma (Rapoport and Cammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1984; Milinski and Wedekind, 1998). 
Still, participants anchored with altruism in this study are encouraged to behave irrationally, while 
the altruistic punisher's are to never forgive defection. The implicit expectation would therefore be 
to observe a forgiving attitude from players anchored with altruism, with a close to zero rate of 
forgiveness from groups of altruistic punishment. In fact, the observed forgiveness within the 
altruistic group was as expected, as they cooperated on average more than one round after being 
defected. Achieving even higher rates of cooperation subsequent to defection would have indicated 
apparent altruistic intentions, but self interest should promote sanctions towards the defecting player
to stop free-riding after failing to initiate mutual cooperation through a forgiving move (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). The surprising part of this analysis is the high rate of forgiveness in the group 
of players that was anchored to behave rationally, the altruistic punishing group. As mentioned in 
the above paragraph, there are several reasons to why players in this setting could cooperate more 
than expected, but these forgiving choices could also be misplaced altruism or signals of indirect 
reciprocity. As these games where observed and judged by a third person, altruistic displays to 
promote their altruistic intentions could potentially benefit the altruistic individual through indirect 
reciprocity from both the opponent and the observer in future interactions (Tullberg, 2004).  
Defective plays following a player’s own first defection are significantly higher in the 
altruistic anchored groups, defectors seem to try to take advantage of the presumed irrational 
behaviour of their opponents. If players believe that their partners will behave irrationally, the 
rational play would be to free ride (Andreoni, 1988). The seemingly rational anchor of altruistic 
punishment, on the other hand, seem to promote a more reciprocal environment, as defections are 
punished and free riding are deprived. These results are in contrast to previous research (Baillet, 
2010; Sally, 1995) where human cooperation is enhanced by increased expectations of partner 
cooperation. Yet, its been observed that previous moves can effect players mood, hence the term 
moody conditional players. This describes increased cooperation following their own cooperation 
and also more defection following their own defection (Grujic et al., 2012; Gutiérrez-Roig et al., 
2014). Moody conditional players are observed in most social dilemmas and should therefore be 
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found in groups within both anchors in this study. That is, free riding is a more likely explanation 
for the defecting behavior observed in this study, rather than a higher percentile of moody defectors 
among the presumed altruist's, than among the altruistic punisher's.   
The findings in this study show that human teenagers take advantage of others presumed 
altruistic behavior, if they get told to be purely altruistic. This occurs even though their opponents 
actually do not adopt that altruistic behavior, and defectors could therefore be better off by being 
cooperative.  The results from the present study suggest that without the sanction methods that are 
implicit in reciprocal systems, an altruistic system could easily degenerate to a selfish system 
(Tullberg and Tullberg, 1994). That is, when players expect an environment of altruistic opponents, 
they find opportunities to take advantage of the presumed altruistic attitude, and when they expect 
to be punished for selfishness, they show reluctance promote their selfish interests.
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Illustration 2: Payout matrix two player 
prisoners dilemma with points as assigned in 
this experiment
6.2 Score sheet
Player 1 Player 2 































Total points player 1: Total points player 2: 
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6.3 Seating diagram
6.4 Anchor for altruism
Altruism (Translated from Norwegian) 
Before we begin playing the game, I wish to remind you of the values that has been important for us
humans since our dawn. 
Humans are social animals that live together in large groups. For groups with a large spectre of 
human interests and personalities to function, a moral code should be present to guide us in 
interaction with our fellow citizens. Without such a base, groups would pulverize in to individual's 
own interests and therefore stop functioning. Each individual's selfish motifs would rule and the 
synergy effects with cooperation would vanish. Members of the rock band “Foo Fighters” could for 
example never establish such a popularity one by one as they did together. Our society are built on 
moral building blocks that yields cooperation through laws and rules for behavior - Behavior that 
promotes synergy and companionships profit that exceeds the profit of individuals. 
These values are built on being nice to each other, but also forgive those who don't show the same  
kindness towards you. Why should one forgive those individuals who act selfishly? Kindness 
develops kindness, and by being generous and react to defection by sacrifice would cooperation 
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establish easier among humans. Kindness to however come at a cost, as signalling ones kindness 
could lead to a danger of exploitation by nasty individuals, but by being genuinely kind, other will 
adapt that kind attitude. It is also important to remember that life goes over an iterate number of 
interactions similar to those of prisoner's dilemma - one can never know how many times in a life 
you would have a interaction with the same person. Its important that one remember that kindness 
develops kindness, and in the long run it's better for everyone to be kind. 
Summarised, to achieve genuine kindness one must be forgiving. To handle defections is not 
necessary easy, but forgiveness of defection is important to help achieving a higher percentile of 
kindness and forgiveness by the counterpart. One should therefore be unlimited kind and have the
best intentions in every situation and forgive everyone that does not show the same grace. If one 
could achieve such an attitude, kindness in others would increase and give gains not only for the 
individual, but for all. Similar to the example of “Foo fighters”.     
6.5. Anchor for altruistic punishment 
Altruistic punishment (Translated from Norwegian)
Before we begin playing the game, I wish to remind you of the values that has been important for us
humans since our dawn. 
Humans are social animals that live together in large groups. For groups with a large spectre of 
human interests and personalities to function, a moral code should be present to guide us in 
interaction with our fellow citizens. Without a such a base, groups would pulverize in to individual's
own interests and therefore stop functioning. Each individual's selfish motifs would rule and the 
synergy effects with cooperation would vanish. Members of the rock band “Foo Fighters” could for 
example never establish such a popularity one by one as they did together. Our society are built on 
moral building blocks that yields cooperation through laws and rules for behavior - Behavior that 
promotes synergy and companionships profit that exceeds the profit of individuals. 
These values are built on being nice to each other, but also punish those who don't show the same  
kindness towards you. Why should one punish those individuals who act selfishly? Kindness 
develops exploitation, and by being generous and react to defection by punishment would 
cooperation establish easier among humans of same values. Kindness to however come at a cost, as
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signalling ones kindness could lead to a danger of exploitation by nasty individuals, but by being 
watchful, other will adapt that attitude to decrease the advantage of defectors. It is also 
important to remember that life goes over an iterate number of interactions similar to those of 
prisoner's dilemma - one can never know how many times in a life you would have a interaction 
with the same person. It's important that one remember that kindness and punishment for 
defectors would be the best strategy, and in the long run it's better for every individual. 
Summarised, to achieve reciprocal behavior one must be kind, but also punish defectors. To 
handle defections is not necessary easy, but punishment of defection is important to help achieving 
a higher percentile of cooperation and punishment by the counterpart. One should therefore be 
careful, have good intentions in every situation and not forgive everyone that does not show the 
same grace. If one could achieve such an attitude, cooperativeness in others would increase and 
give gains not only for the individual, but for all. Similar to the example of “Foo fighters”. 
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